Logic is still in the melting pot but one thing gets more and more obvious to me: the prop[ositions] of Logic contain ONLY APPARENT variables and whatever may turn out to be the proper explanation of apparent variables its consequence must be that there are NO logical constants. Number 4 on your handout. I have changed my views on "atomic" complexes I think there cannot be different Types of things! In other words whatever can be symbolized by a simple proper name must belong to one type. And further: every theory of types must be rendered superfluous by a proper theory of symbolism Number 5 on your handout.
On the basis of these and other remarks, Wittgenstein is commonly read as a philosopher who aims to prevent us from misusing language by using nonsense to point to a correct understanding of our symbolism. On such a reading, to correctly understand the logic of our language is to see one's own metaphysical talk as nonsensical. To view Wittgenstein as resisting Russell. That is, Wittgenstein can subscribe to an unsayable doctrine of misuses and uses of language, only if he assumes that what it is to use or misuse language is settled.
Thus Ricketts, as we saw, attributes to Wittgenstein the view that: "Relations are not things, are not entities; relations cannot be labeled or designated". I suggest a different interpretation. I argue that Wittgenstein is not to be read as advocating a theory of language, or of philosophical misuses of language. To begin with, I ask, Can the view attributed to Wittgenstein by Ricketts and others prevent philosophical nonsense? The nonsense with which Wittgenstein is concerned, philosophical nonsense, is prima facie grammatical and thus not obviously nonsensical.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
On the view I am attributing to Wittgenstein, his point is that grammar, the appearance of sense, underdetermines what it is to misuse language. There is no fixed category of nonsense, of philosophical misuses of language. Nevertheless, we do sometimes engage in philosophical nonsense. That is, it seems to me that it is Wittgenstein's fundamental insight is that nonsense is not a characteristic of some language use, as though there were certain words and phrases which themselves were to be rejected, but rather Wittgenstein holds that nonsense is relative to particular desires to use words in a certain ways in a particular contexts.
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On my dialectical reading, Wittgenstein does not take for granted a notion of what it is to misspeak in the sense that might enable him to mean , though he cannot say, that "Relations are not things, are not entities; relations cannot be labeled or designated. By that I mean, we must read Wittgenstein's response to Russell's theory of types and belief to be advocating no particular theory or doctrine e.
What is characteristic of this sort of dialectical philosophy is its beginning with the question, Is there any definiteness to what I am doing in my own thinking and speaking? That is, Wittgenstein's remarks are to be read as questioning the attempt to give a philosophical theory as though we could take our starting point for granted and proceed straightforwardly with assertions. I read Wittgenstein as reacting to Russell and his doctrines for aiming to prevent nonsense, because he, Wittgenstein, presupposes no such definiteness concerning Russell's or his own philosophical misuses of language.
I am suggesting that many of the ordinary assumptions we bring to bear in reading a philosophical text of the early Wittgenstein no longer hold, especially those expectations that bear on how we are to understand the connection between philosophy and the value of life. Wittgenstein's remarks must be read as embodying a sense of the value of life and its connection to philosophy that is entirely alien in spirit to a Russellian or Fregean context of interests and aims. For Russell, the happy man is not the man of instinct but rather the philosopher whose life is deepened by grappling with great subjects and uncertain answers.
On this reading, Wittgenstein's addresses not so much Russell's doctrine as Russell the man, that is, the conception Russell has of how his activity of doing philosophy is related to understanding. Their confrontation has the sense of going deeply into what is highly personal because Wittgenstein's objections are personal: they expose deep differences between Russell and Wittgenstein on how value enters in life, and is connected to philosophy.
Wittgenstein's disdain for Russell's willingness to argue for the value of philosophy, as something extrinsic to it that adds worth, is not incidental here. I read, for the sake of its irony, what Russell writes to Ottoline on March 12, He [Wittgenstein] abominates ethics and morals generally; he is deliberately a creature of impulse, and thinks one should be. What he disliked about my last chapter [in the Problems of Philosophy ] was saying philosophy has value ; he says people who like philosophy will pursue it, and others won't, and there's an end to it.
His strongest impulse is philosophy. I won't answer for his technical morals.
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When he left me I was strangely excited by him. He is the young man one hopes for Anscombe and with an English translation by G. Anscombe Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Note that Ricketts continues: "But this way of talking is itself misleading for its use of "object" and "relation" as a contrasting pair of common nouns. Griffin, p. Diamond, C.
2. The Early Wittgenstein
Cambridge University. Dreben, B. Glock and R. Arrington, eds. Floyd, J. Forthcoming in L. Rouner, ed. Friedlander, E. Dissertation, Harvard University. Hintikka, J. Hintikka, M. Blackwell, Oxford. Ricketts, T. Stern and H. Sluga, eds. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.
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Read preview. Synopsis "The philosopher strives to find the liberating word, that is, the word that finally permits us to grasp what up until now has intangibly weighed down our consciousness. This is the basic contention of this strikingly innovative new study of the Tractatus. Matthew Ostrow argues that, far from seeking to offer a new theory in logic in the tradition of Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein viewed all such endeavors as the ensnarement of thought.
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The Dialectic of Interpretations: Reading Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Heck Jr. Oxford University Press, Avey H. Holt and Company,
Related Wittgensteins Tractatus: A Dialectical Interpretation
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